It has nothing to do with guns. It has to do with getting kids comfortable turning in their friends and family.
That is ALL it is. Why? Because every child doing anything any bureaucrat- no matter where in the nation- thinks is “wrong” is punished and the tattlers are rewarded. And we can’t stop them. (Actually we can, but that takes lawsuits and firing all the school board members who approved the principals.)
Here we have kids ratting a special needs kid and getting rewarded by seeing the administration punish the kid. This is on purpose and too big to be anything but a concentrated effort by all government types.
Amy Parham said her son, Rhett, had made the hand-drawn picture of the bomb during the weekend at home. Parham said her son is a fan of the video game Bomber Man and drew the cartoon-ish like explosive.
Parham said her son took the picture to Hillcrest Middle School, and that’s where problems arose.
Parham said she was told that her son showed the picture to some older children, who reported him to school administration. She said her son was suspended indefinitely by the school.
“They actually reiterated to me they knew he was non-violent,” said Parham. “They knew he was not actually having a bomb, creating or making a bomb. But that they could not go with out making an example of him and take some type of action because they were worried about their perception. Perception is actually the word he used. Perception is reality, and parents might think you have a bomb or [might be] violent.”
Blah blah blah, dangerous threats, and all that bull from the educators (which Bill Buckley warned us about in 1955!)
Truth is someday soon the same people who have stroked the heads of the tattlers and told them what good citizens they were, will ask them about their mom and dad and what they have.
And the police and the judges will allow that statement as PC to create warrants. Then it is you that goes to jail. You watch. How do I know? Mao did it, and did it with great success. I urge all of you to read “Mao’s Last Revolution” to get a handle on what is going on with your nation. The group behind Obama cut their hippie revolutionary teeth on Mao. They love him, follow him and have learned a great deal from him- including how to turn your kids into liberal loving monsters. Here is a piece from one review.
After the disastrous Great Leap Forward of 1958-62, in which millions of Chinese farmers had starved to death as the result of his utopian agricultural policies, Mao had been forced to step back from his paramount role within the leadership. In addition, he was concerned that the revolutionary ardour that had fuelled his revolution was fading. In the 1960s, for the first time in over a century, a generation of Chinese was coming of age that did not have to worry about foreign aggression, or of the country being torn apart by civil war. Aside from the major disaster of the Great Leap, the economy was doing well. The Party, Mao felt, had become bureaucratised, complacent and stale, keener on office than revolution. As obsessed with continuous revolution as he had been as a young man, Mao decided that it was the CCP itself that must be destroyed so as to renew itself and that the country’s youth would be the instrument of that renewal. In spring and summer 1966, Mao persuaded his colleagues to launch the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, a movement that would eventually destroy many of the comrades who had helped Mao to bring it about. The most obvious manifestation of the new order, causing consternation in the outside world, was the authorisation of China’s young to declare themselves to be ‘Red Guards’ who were charged with correcting the ‘mistakes’ of their elders. The Guards promptly attacked teachers, doctors, party officials and anyone else who thought that their authority lay in their age or expertise, rather than in a fanatical devotion to the thought of Chairman Mao. Before the Cultural Revolution was officially ended in 1976, China would be transformed. Some 12 million Red Guards made their way to Beijing, determined to get a glimpse of Mao in Tiananmen Square; a similar number of urban youth were ‘sent down’ to the countryside to ‘learn from the peasants’ (even though the peasants were not particularly delighted to see them). Some 2.2 billion Chairman Mao badges would be forged as part of the cult of personality that raised Mao Zedong Thought almost to a theology. During 1967, the most violent year of the Red Guard period, national industrial output dropped by 14.9 per cent, although the damage was mostly concentrated in the cities and affected agriculture far less. Most lastingly, China’s schools and colleges were effectively shut down for years, producing a generation of Chinese, now in their 50s and 60s, who gained little education and found themselves profoundly ill-equipped for the high-technology, globalising turn that China has taken since the 1980s.
The “kids” in the Red Guard were often middle schoolers. They went out and captured and tortured and killed anyone they thought Mao may think was a traitor. No trials, no judges, no evidence, just chaos- which is what Mao wanted. I read a diary noted in the book where a young man happily described how he knifed a family to death for Mao. Some of the victims were as young as five.
Think about how lucky we are in this nation that our leadership can’t make kids do that…yet. (Some might argue the current green lighting of violence by the administration is an example but the Red Guard was generations in the making. Of course, one has to wonder if Obama did make a national call to arms how many would rise up and for how long? Till the EBT went broke or the weed ran out?)
Another review of the book asks the question why Mao tried to destroy what he had built. I believe frankly they over think the reason. Mao was a psychopath for one and he was losing control for another. So the choice for him was simple, destroy any perceived threat regardless of the harm it did to his country. He did it by changing positions and creating internal distrust and conflict. (sound familiar?)
Why did Mao do it? This has always been the master puzzle of the Cultural Revolution. MacFarquhar and Schoenhals do not formulate an overall answer, but two lines of interpretation emerge from their narrative. Neither of their arguments fully makes sense, and taken together they even leave the authors themselves dissatisfied.
MacFarquhar and Schoenhals suggest, for a start, that Mao was motivated by revolutionary ideals. Thus, after asking, “Why did China’s supreme leader decide to tear down what he had done so much to create?,” they answer by describing Mao’s theory of revisionism. This theory had its source in Mao’s disappointment with the Soviet experiment, which he believed had created a privileged bureaucratic class that abandoned revolutionary ideals. To prevent the same thing happening in China, he set out to “smash the old culture,” “weed out capitalist roaders in the Party,” and create a “new socialist man.” Elsewhere the authors say that “the Cultural Revolution had always been about the rearing of revolutionary successors,” and that Mao sought to “temper” his successors in the “surging waves” of the mass movement because he believed that human nature could be remolded through struggle. The masses, he believed, “had to liberate themselves.”
The irony of this theory has been clear ever since Li Zhisui, in his memoir of his life as Mao’s personal physician, exposed the self-indulgent way Mao lived: his multiple villas, private trains, and serial mistresses; his personal cruelty to everyone around him; and his lack of interest in the suffering of the masses. Mao was given to apparently jocular but genuinely chilling remarks such as that China would do fine even if two-thirds of its population died in a nuclear war, and that the universe would survive even if the Earth were destroyed. MacFarquhar and Schoenhals do not cite these dicta, but they report him as saying: “This man Hitler was even more ferocious. The more ferocious the better, don’t you think?” And this: “Beijing is too civilized! I would say there is not a great deal of disorder … and that the number of hooligans is very small. Now is not the time to interfere.” At one happy private occasion, Mao offered this toast: “To the unfolding of nationwide all-round civil war!”
Clearly, Mao was a hypocrite in his personal life and a terrorist-from-above in his politics. But none of this proves that he did not believe what he said about “continuous revolution.” If Mao was serious about his vision, however, why did he make such a hash of it? Even his closest colleagues found his demands vague, contradictory, and changing. First he endorsed the takeover of power in Shanghai by the workers, then he changed his mind and lodged what MacFarquhar and Schoenhals call a series of “absurd quibbles” as a way of ordering a reversal. First he ordered local military units to “support the left,” then he ordered officers to undertake self-criticism for doing so. First he encouraged the leftist acolytes Wang Li, Guan Feng, and Qi Benyu to promote “dragging out a small handful in the military,” then he ordered their arrest for being too radical. Over and over MacFarquhar and Schoenhals show that no one understood what Mao wanted. “After the session, the minister of education … said to his colleagues, ‘Now I am very confused.'” “Amazingly, it would seem as if the identity of the person or persons ‘like Khrushchev’ to whom the Chairman was alluding escaped even members of Mao’s inner circle.” “The participants [in the central work conference] had no idea what accorded with or violated Mao’s grand design.” “Misperceptions of Mao’s attitude, induced by his contradictory behavior, quite probably helped to precipitate the February Countercurrent.”
Still less could young students, workers, and cadres imbibe any reliable message from Mao’s cryptic words and contradictory actions. Those who committed themselves most strongly to the “ism” attached to Mao’s name — people such as the philosophy professor Nie Yuanzi, the Red Guard leader Kuai Dafu, and the ideologist Chen Boda — ended up in the countryside learning from the peasants, or in prison. The eventual result after Mao’s death was a society more cynically materialistic than perhaps any other on earth.
MacFarquhar and Schoenhals’s second line of interpretation is that Mao launched the Cultural Revolution as a form of power struggle, to bring down his rivals within the party. They quote him as saying, “Of all the important things, the possession of power is the most important.” After discussing Mao’s concern with revisionism, they segue into his antipathy for Liu Shaoqi, the number-two in the leadership, who, unlike the pliant Zhou Enlai, “had no intention of abandoning his critical faculties” when responding to Mao’s directives. In this view of the Cultural Revolution, Mao saw plots all around him. When his senior colleagues took over policy-making after the failure of the Great Leap Forward, he decided to take power back. He targeted officials in the cultural sphere first because they were less important, and used that stratagem to draw out their more powerful patrons. As he changed the party line, more and more cadres flunked the loyalty test, enabling him to widen the purge.
The lesson here and in China was simple. The same one I quoted to my friend back in 2008. “A bad man in a powerful position can do great harm. Not only for what he can do, but for what others will do in his name.”
And training kids to be snitches and react to the authority of the government over the teachings of their parents is part and parcel of the “how to do it.”
My advice is every time, EVERY time your school administrators act like little Maoists, punish them. Fire them, protest them, refuse them service in your restaurants, churches and stores. Let them know YOU control your community, not them. They’ll straighten up or leave, either is just as good.