Then walk away. When they come to you later, angered and fearful, just shrug your shoulders. You didn’t vote for the guy.
A couple of weeks ago, my MENSA bright buddy pointed out that the Obama administration was pivoting away from Europe and the Middle East and towards the Far East (China, India, Indochina). The obvious reasons are the vast majority of the people live there, the economies are growing, and the labor is cheap. Add to the mix our South American partners, and we could walk away from the thousands of years of religious war, European nationalism and other problems we’ve tried to manage for two centuries.
I get that. What I don’t get is Obama favoring Iran over Saudi Arabia or any other nation in the region, and trust me, the Saudis don’t either. However, this essay helps explain the plan, and it also stops me from wondering what our Middle East policy and plans are. Obama has been criticized for not having one. I disagree. He most definitely has a plan, just not a wise one.
President Barack Obama wishes the Islamic Republic of Iran every success. Its leaders, he explained in a recent interview, stand at a crossroads. They can choose to press ahead with their nuclear program, thereby continuing to flout the will of the international community and further isolate their country; or they can accept limitations on their nuclear ambitions and enter an era of harmonious relations with the rest of the world. “They have a path to break through that isolation and they should seize it,” the president urged—because “if they do, there’s incredible talent and resources and sophistication . . . inside of Iran, and it would be a very successful regional power.”
How eager is the president to see Iran break through its isolation and become a very successful regional power? Very eager. A year ago, Benjamin Rhodes, deputy national-security adviser for strategic communication and a key member of the president’s inner circle, shared some good news with a friendly group of Democratic-party activists. The November 2013 nuclear agreement between Tehran and the “P5+1”—the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany—represented, he said, not only “the best opportunity we’ve had to resolve the Iranian [nuclear] issue,” but “probably the biggest thing President Obama will do in his second term on foreign policy.” For the administration, Rhodes emphasized, “this is healthcare . . . , just to put it in context.” Unaware that he was being recorded, he then confided to his guests that Obama was planning to keep Congress in the dark and out of the picture: “We’re already kind of thinking through, how do we structure a deal so we don’t necessarily require legislative action right away.”
Why the need to bypass Congress? Rhodes had little need to elaborate. As the president himself once noted balefully, “[T]here is hostility and suspicion toward Iran, not just among members of Congress but the American people”—and besides, “members of Congress are very attentive to what Israel says on its security issues.” And that “hostility and suspicion” still persist, prompting the president in his latest State of the Union address to repeat his oft-stated warning that he will veto “any new sanctions bill that threatens to undo [the] progress” made so far toward a “comprehensive agreement” with the Islamic Republic.
As far as the president is concerned, the less we know about his Iran plans, the better. Yet those plans, as Rhodes stressed, are not a minor or incidental component of his foreign policy. To the contrary, they are central to his administration’s strategic thinking about the role of the United States in the world, and especially in the Middle East.
Moreover, that has been true from the beginning. In the first year of Obama’s first term, a senior administration official would later tell David Sanger of the New York Times, “There were more [White House] meetings on Iran than there were on Iraq, Afghanistan, and China. It was the thing we spent the most time on and talked about the least in public [emphasis added].” All along, Obama has regarded his hoped-for “comprehensive agreement” with Iran as an urgent priority, and, with rare exceptions, has consistently wrapped his approach to that priority in exceptional layers of secrecy.
From time to time, critics and even friends of the president have complained vocally about the seeming disarray or fecklessness of the administration’s handling of foreign policy. Words like amateurish, immature, and incompetent are bandied about; what’s needed, we’re told, is less ad-hoc fumbling, more of a guiding strategic vision. Most recently, Leslie Gelb, a former government official and past president of the Council on Foreign Relations, has charged that “the Obama team lacks the basic instincts and judgment necessary to conduct U.S. national-security policy,” and has urged the president to replace the entire inner core of his advisers with “strong and strategic people of proven . . . experience.”
One sympathizes with Gelb’s sense of alarm, but his premises are mistaken. Inexperience is a problem in this administration, but there is no lack of strategic vision. Quite the contrary: a strategy has been in place from the start, and however clumsily it may on occasion have been implemented, and whatever resistance it has generated abroad or at home, Obama has doggedly adhered to the policies that have flowed from it.
In what follows, we’ll trace the course of the most important of those policies and their contribution to the president’s announced determination to encourage and augment Iran’s potential as a successful regional power and as a friend and partner to the United States.
2009-2010: Round One, Part I
In the giddy aftermath of Obama’s electoral victory in 2008, anything seemed possible. The president saw himself as a transformational leader, not just in domestic politics but also in the international arena, where, as he believed, he had been elected to reverse the legacy of his predecessor, George W. Bush. To say that Obama regarded Bush’s foreign policy as anachronistic is an understatement. To him it was a caricature of yesteryear, the foreign-policy equivalent of Leave It to Beaver. Obama’s mission was to guide America out of Bushland, an arena in which the United States assembled global military coalitions to defeat enemies whom it depicted in terms like “Axis of Evil,” and into Obamaworld, a place more attuned to the nuances, complexities, and contradictions—and opportunities—of the 21st century. In today’s globalized environment, Obama told the United Nations General Assembly in September 2009, “our destiny is shared, power is no longer a zero-sum game. No one nation can or should try to dominate another nation. . . . No balance of power among nations will hold.”
Read the rest. When you get done, you will finally grasp what we have been witnessing for a long time and wondering what in the hell was wrong with this guy. The sad truth is nothing is wrong with him. He’s just willing to give up a hundred years of Western influence, reset the boundaries of nations using violence and chaos, and leave a Islamic fundamentalist government, which owns a nuke, in charge.
Seriously, what could go wrong?
Well, early on Obama had a chance to help the Iranian Green revolution seize control of the nation away from the nutjobs running it, which would have solved the whole issue of having to deal with them. So, there is that.
But Obama passed and a lot of people got killed. All so he could force his policy and desires onto the reality. (Something he does a lot.)
Obama based his policy of outreach to Tehran on two key assumptions of the grand-bargain myth: that Tehran and Washington were natural allies, and that Washington itself was the primary cause of the enmity between the two. If only the United States were to adopt a less belligerent posture, so the thinking went, Iran would reciprocate. In his very first television interview from the White House, Obama announced his desire to talk to the Iranians, to see “where there are potential avenues for progress.” Echoing his inaugural address, he said, “[I]f countries like Iran are willing to unclench their fist, they will find an extended hand from us.”
Unfortunately, the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei, ignored the president’s invitation. Five months later, in June 2009, when the Green Movement was born, his autocratic fist was still clenched. As the streets of Tehran exploded in the largest anti-government demonstrations the country had seen since the revolution of 1979, he used that fist to beat down the protesters. For their part, the protesters, hungry for democratic reform and enraged by government rigging of the recent presidential election, appealed to Obama for help. He responded meekly, issuing tepid statements of support while maintaining a steady posture of neutrality. To alienate Khamenei, after all, might kill the dream of a new era in U.S.-Iranian relations.
If this show of deference was calculated to warm the dictator’s heart, it failed. “What we intended as caution,” one of Obama’s aides would later tell a reporter, “the Iranians saw as weakness.” Indeed, the president’s studied “caution” may even have emboldened Tehran to push forward, in yet another in the long series of blatant violations of its obligations under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), with its construction of a secret uranium enrichment facility in an underground bunker at Fordow, near Qom.
Oh yeah, that goofy nuclear thing where the theocracy in charge of Iran wants a nuke and at the same time believes if the region goes up in flames it pushes their version of Islamic dominance closer to the end goal. That’s a bit iffy. But remember, Obama did go to Harvard.
And what about Israel? Obama’s position is simple- screw ’em!
The Israelis did more than just criticize Obama; they also threatened to take action against Iran that would place the president in an intolerable dilemma. In 2011, Ehud Barak, the defense minister at the time, announced that Iran was quickly approaching a “zone of immunity,” meaning that its nuclear program would henceforth be impervious to Israeli attack. As Iran approached that zone, Israel would have no choice but to strike. And what would America do then? The Israeli warnings grew ever starker as the presidential election season heated up. Netanyahu, it seemed, was using the threat of Israeli action as a way of prodding Washington itself to take a harder line.
To this challenge, Obama responded by putting Israel in a bear hug. From one angle, it looked like an expression of profound friendship: the president significantly increased military and intelligence cooperation, and he insisted, fervently and loudly, that his policy was to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon by all means possible. With the aid of influential American Jews and Israelis who testified to his sincerity, Obama successfully blunted the force of the charge that he was hostile to Israel.
From another angle, however, the bear hug looked like an effort to break Netanyahu’s ribs. Even while expressing affection for Israel, Obama found ways to signal his loathing for its prime minister. During one tense meeting at the White House, for example, the president abruptly broke off to join his family for dinner, leaving Netanyahu to wait for him alone. In mitigation, Obama supporters would adduce ongoing friction between the two countries over West Bank settlements and peace negotiations with the Palestinians. This was true enough, but the two men differed on quite a number of issues, among which Iran held by far the greatest strategic significance. In managing the anxieties of his liberal Jewish supporters, Obama found it useful to explain the bad atmosphere as a function of Netanyahu’s “extremism” rather than of his own outreach to Iran—to suggest, in effect, that if only the hothead in the room would sit down and shut up, the grownups could proceed to resolve the Iranian nuclear problem along reasonable lines.
The tactic proved effective. At least for the duration, Obama prevented Israel from attacking Iran; preserved American freedom of action with regard to Iran’s nuclear program; and kept his disagreements with the Israeli government within the comfort zone of American Jewish Democrats.
Israel has over two hundred nukes and little desire to use them unless threatened with extinction. Iran wants nukes so they can launch them at Israel. Israel is small and densely populated with a little over eight million people. Iran is large and sparsely populated with seventy-seven million potential martyrs. Two nukes could cripple Israel and put her in a situation where surrounding Hamas and other armies could swarm her, which means they get lit up too! Iran could take the loss of half its population and survive. I mean, who is going to invade Iran? Iraq? The plan is for Iran to run Iraq (much to the horror of the Sunni and Kurd population), so that’s not going to happen.
According to the author, the key to the Iranian dominance was not the election of their “moderate” leader, but the reelection of Obama. Remember, Obama is a malignant narcissist who is LONG time friends with the Iranian and fellow communist sympathizer Valerie Jarrett. Both Obama and his inner circle, led by Jarrett, really want to change the way the world works. For many reasons, some ego driven, other more along the line of what is called the transnational progressivism. This theory of world government is what all the conspiracy theorists are trying to grasp, quantify and expose.
Which, in my opinion is a wasted effort. There is no need to expose them. They are right there in front of you. Their first attempt at this was the EU. Look how that has worked out.
The key concepts of transnational progressivism are:
Groups are what matter, not people. You are “Black” or “Christian” or “Mexican” or “Afghan” or “Sunni”, you are not yourself. You also don’t get to choose your group; it’s inherent in what you were when you were born. Someone else will categorize you into your group, and you will become a number, a body to count to decide how important that group is. And your group won’t change during your lifetime.
The goal of fairness is equality of result, not equality of opportunity. It isn’t important to let individuals fulfill their potential and express their dreams, what’s important is to make groups have power and representation in all things proportional to their numbers in the population. Fairness is for groups, not for individuals. The ideally fair system is based on quotas, not on merit, because that permits proper precise allocation of results.
Being a victim is politically significant. It’s not merely a plea for help or something to be pitied; it’s actually a status that grants extra political power. “Victimhood” isn’t a cult, it’s a valid political evaluation. Groups which are victims should be granted disproportionately more influence and representation, at the expense of the historic “dominant” culture.
Assimilation is evil. Immigrants must remain what they were before they arrived here, and should be treated that way. Our system must adapt to them, rather than expecting them to adapt to us (even if they want to). The migration of people across national borders is a way to ultimately erase the significance of those borders by diluting national identity in the destination country.
An ideal democracy is a coalition where political power is allocated among groups in proportion to their numbers. It has nothing to do with voting or with individual citizens expressing opinions, and in fact it doesn’t require elections at all. A “winner take all” system, or one ruled by a majority, is profoundly repugnant because it disenfranchise minority groups of all kinds and deprives them of their proper share of power.
National identity is evil. We should try to think of ourselves as citizens of the world, not as citizens of the nations in which we live, and we should try to minimize the effects of national interests, especially our own if we live in powerful nations.
And the people who promote the concept are, surprisingly, the same group they believe should be running it. Of course, why not…
The social base of transnational progressivism constitutes a rising postnational intelligentsia (international law professors, NGO activists, foundation officers, UN bureaucrats, EU administrators, corporate executives, and politicians.) When social movements such as “transnationalism” and “global governance” are depicted as the result of social forces or the movement of history, a certain impersonal inevitability is implied. However, in the twentieth century the Bolshevik Revolution, the National Socialist revolution, the New Deal, the Reagan Revolution, the Gaullist national reconstruction in France, and the creation of the EU were not inevitable, but were the result of the exercise of political will by elites.
Similarly, transnationalism, multiculturalism, and global governance, like “diversity,” are ideological tools championed by activist elites, not impersonal forces of history. The success or failure of these values-laden concepts will ultimately depend upon the political will and effectiveness of these elites.
So if we have Obama being run by people who want to run the world, and he wants to redesign the Middle East leaving Iran (and Russia) in charge of that region, how is that going to work out of you and me?
Frankly, he doesn’t care. We are just batteries providing power to the machine his people are going to control. The rest is just white noise, that humming in the background everyone ignores.
Worse, we cannot depend on the Congress to step up. I believe they know the nation is screwed in the short term and crippled in the long. It looks like they don’t care, as seen in this poster below, but I think they just can’t do anything about it because of PC and their own need for power. Remember, they know people who go to Davos too! Whose pockets are getting lined or will after they retire?
If Iran dominates the region and acts as a counterweight to the Saudis, then Obama’s theory is the region will balance out. If Iran can control the Iraqi oil reserves, it will become the fifth largest producer of oil according to one report. Why Obama thinks that will serve the United States well is beyond me, so I’m thinking, as I said earlier, he doesn’t care. If we run short of energy and the costs go up, it is a win for him anyway.
Read the whole essay and think on it for awhile. It’s over unless something gives. Transnational Progressives have control of large swaths of world governments. Their goals will be met, or their attempts will cause great harm, which will unsettle nations. They will demonize and eliminate, if they can, any nationalist effort by citizens. (Helloooo Tea Party!)
And they don’t care. I heard rumor many of the uber rich are buying remote locations around the world in order to flee and survive what they feel may be the coming civil unrest when all the money is gone and the resources dry up. These people are the same people who attend Davos every years and control most of the world’s money.
Super rich hedge fund managers are buying ‘secret boltholes’ where they can hideout in the event of civil uprising against growing inequality, it has been claimed.
Nervous financiers from across the globe have begun purchasing landing strips, homes and land in areas such as New Zealand so they can flee should people rise up.
Robert Johnson, president of the Institute of New Economic Thinking, told people at the World Economic Forum in Davos that many hedge fund managers were already planning their escapes.
What is funny is they seem to not quite get the big picture. There is no escape. If you can get to it, I can get to it, and so can millions of other really pissed off citizens. Unless the uber rich buy a piece of land on the moon and a rocket to get there, they had better realize it is far safer to manage the world effectively than to trash it, all the while stealing all they can. Something I fear Obama and his ilk do not grasp.
Chaos is like a rabid dog you let off the lease to bite your enemy. Sooner or later, it is going to turn and bite you. Take a look at ISIL if you don’t believe me.